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Abstract
This paper (1) proposes new variables to detect informed high-
frequency trading (HFT), (2) shows that HFT can help to predict
takeover targets, and (3) shows that HFT inuences target announce-
ment announcement returns. Prior literature suggests that informed
trade may occur before takeovers, but has not examined the role of
HFT and has relied on monthly measures of informed trade (such
as PIN or the spread components). I propose microstructure-based
variables to detect HFT that are derived from hazard modeling and
from VWAP trading algorithms. I show that these can help predict
takeover targets and are signicantly related to target announcement
returns. This highlights the existence of pre-takeover informed trade
and the need to control for it when analyzing takeover returns.
1 Introduction
This paper proposes measures to detect high frequency trading (HFT), shows
that HFT can help predict takeover targets, and nds that HFT inuences
Email address: M.HumpheryJenner@unsw.edu.au. I thank Rudiger Fahlenbrach, Fari-
borz Moshirian, Ronan Powell, Jianxin Wang, Ken Wessen, and Bohui Zhang. I also
beneted from comments at the 2009 Australasian Finance and Banking Conference.
1target announcement returns. I contribute to the literature on the detection
of HFT and informed trade, takeover returns, and takeover prediction. The
intuition for focusing on HFT is twofold. First, high-levels of HFT repre-
sent a liquid investor base, implying that there may be a stronger market
reaction on the announcement. Second, high levels of HFT might reect pre-
announcement informed speculation, implying the possibility of a takeover
and suggesting pre-takeover informed trade. This implies that failing to con-
trol for HFT might induce an omitted variable bias in studies that analyze
takeover returns, and contributes to the policy debate on the regulation of
HFT.
HFT has proliferated and has become a live regulatory issue. HFT and
algorithmic trading have increased in popularity (Chew, 2007; Degryse, Van
Achter and Wuyts, 2009). Up to 67% of investment managers indicate that
they use trading algorithms (Grossman, 2005). They may become more
prolic due to the emergence of `best execution' requirements as in MIFID
(following Anolli and Petrella, 2007; Brandes and Domowitz, 2011). Trading
algorithms provide one way to for informed traders to shift large blocks of
stock while minimizing transaction costs (Humphery-Jenner, 2011; Kissell,
Glantz and Malamut, 2004; Kissell and Malamut, 2005, 2006). Subsequently,
HFT has been linked to market manipulation and informed trade, raising the
possibility of regulating HFT (Bhupathi, 2010; McGowan, 2010; Serritella,
2010). However, there is a dearth of tractable proxies for the presence of
HFT, and the literature has not analyzed the relation between HFT and
2informed trade.
The motivation of this study is to contribute to, and to address gaps
in, four strands of literature: informed trade measurement, pre-takeover in-
formed trade, takeover prediction, and the determinants of target returns.
First, I contribute to the `informed trade' literature. Proxies for the pres-
ence of HFT are especially important because traders do not have access to
trader IDs; and thus, need ways to transform anonymous trade data into
measures of HFT and informed trade. Prior literature focuses on monthly
measures such as PIN and the components of the bid ask spread. However,
the literature lacks daily measures of informed trade that incorporate intra-
day trading dynamics. I provide a new daily measure of informed trade. It is
based on the intraday frequency of trades. Specically, it is shape parameter
of a Weibull distribution that models the end in a `lull' in trade. I com-
pute the shape parameter using method of moments. This variable captures
the frequency of trades; and thus, represents the presence of high-frequency
trade. I also examine intraday deviations from a `standard' trading volume
prole. This provides a measure of the frequency of trading, which represents
the existence of HFT.
Second, I contribute to the literature on pre-announcement informed
trade. The important nding is that there is some evidence of pre-takeover
informed trade. Cumming and Li (2011) nd a stock-price run-up in tar-
gets and acquirers before takeover announcements. Cao, Chen and Grin
(2005) nd signicant informed trade in the options market before takeover
3announcements. Farin os Vi~ nas, Garcia and Ibanez (2003) nd that the in-
formation asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread increases before a
takeover announcement. Further, Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck and Van Oppens
(2007) indicate that order-imbalance is higher before a takeover announce-
ment; however, nd little relation between PIN and merger announcements.
The problem with most of these results are (1) they rely on `monthly'-type
variables. For example, PIN or the decomposition of the bid-ask spread
require at least a month of intraday data. (2) The insider trading papers
usually rely on information about insider trades,1 which is non-public and
thus not useful to the general market. (3) the daily measures (such as daily
order imbalance) ignore intraday trading patterns; and thus, exclude po-
tentially useful information. I show that there is daily `informed trade' (as
proxied by the intraday frequency of trading) in target stock before takeover
announcements.
Third, the paper contributes to the takeover prediction literature. Myriad
papers have attempted to predict takeover targets. These models aim to pre-
dict targets in order to capture abnormal returns on and after the announce-
ment of a takeover. These models are typically based on annual (sometimes
quarterly) rm-level data (see Barnes, 1990, 1999; Powell, 2001, 1997). Brar,
Giamouridis and Liodakis (2009) incorporate market-based daily returns.
The studies have not analyzed pre-takeover informed trade as a prediction
1See for example: Bris (2005); Keown and Pinkerton (1981); Meulbroek (1992); Meul-
broek and Hart (1997); Seyhun (1990).
4mechanism. This is a problem due to the hypothesized presence of informed
HFT before takeovers.
Fourth, I show an additional driver of takeover (target) returns. The liter-
ature indicates that targets earn signicant abnormal returns in the window
surrounding a takeover announcement.2 Prior literature has also examined
the drivers of acquirer returns. Prior literature has not examined HFT as a
driver of returns. However, HFT might inuence returns by (a) representing
greater market interest in the stock, suggesting a more liquid market and a
potentially greater reaction to news; and (b) indicating pre-announcement
informed trade and speculation, which might impound takeover-related infor-
mation. Thus, failure to properly control for pre-takeover HFT might induce
omitted variable bias in cross-sectional regressions of acquirer and/or target
returns.
The results conrm the presence of informed trade before takeover an-
nouncements and highlight the importance of HFT-based proxies. These
proxies are signicantly related to the occurrence of takeover events and to
takeover returns. I obtain these results by analyzing a sample of rms listed
on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) between 1998 and 2008. The sam-
ple comprises 1014 rm-day observations on which there is a takeover bid,
and 1,262,468 rm-day observations on which there is no takeover bid. Ad-
vantages of using the ASX are that (a) it has a wide cross-section of both
2See for example: Andrade and Staord (2004); Baugess, Moeller, Schlingemann and
Zutter (2009); Campa and Hernando (2004); Franks and Harris (1989); Goergen and Ren-
neboog (2004); Jensen and Ruback (1983); Schwert (1996).
5liquid and liquid stocks, (b) it has allowed direct market access for the whole
of the sample period (thereby facilitating electronic trading), (c) has had a
purely electronic limit order book for the whole of the sample period (as op-
posed to an open out cry market), (d) it has strong insider trading rules and
an eective regulatory. These results should be generalizable to all developed
markets that enable direct market access.
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes ways to
capture the presence of HFT. Section 3 describes the sample and empirical
methodology. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Measuring trade frequency
The rst issue is to determine how to measure the presence of HFT. The
presence of HFT is not a binary variable (i.e. it is not that either there
is HFT or there is not). Rather, the focus should be on high-frequency
trading dynamics. The important focuses are the frequency of trades and the
presence of intraday volume spikes. Thus, I analyze three HFT variables: the
Weibull shape parameter, inspired by hazard modeling; the level of abnormal
trade, inspired by VWAP trading, and the intraday order imbalance.
2.1 Weibull Shape Parameter
Here, I observe that there is a time interval between trades. Gourieroux,
Jasiak and Le Fol (1999) observe that the duration between trades indicates
6the level of trade intensity, and imply that it may imply informed trade.
I cull this time interval a `lull' in trading. A shorter time-interval means
higher-frequency trade. Thus, one approach is to model the time between
trades. I focus on modeling the time until a trading lull ends. The Weibull
distribution is particularly appropriate for modeling this trading lull. The
Weibull distribution has seen frequent use in the failure prediction literature.3
Thus, I use the shape parameter for the Weibull distribution.
I compute the shape parameter using a method of moments approach.4 I
assume a two-parameter Weibull model. This model has a scale parameter
() and a shape parameter (). The goal is to nd an estimate for . The
process is:
1. Dene the the rst and second moments as:


































Divide the m2 by the square of m1 to obtain:
3Examples include: Brookman and Thistle (2009); Giot and Schwienbacher (2007); Lee
and Urrutia (1996); Wong (1995).
4This approach is not new and has seen prior use, see: Cran (1988); Gove (2003);


















Equation (3) This implicitly denes shape parameter .
2. Compute 2






2 as the average time between trades for stock i on day t, and 2 as
variance of the time between trades.
3. Iterate through  values from 0.1 to 10. Compute 2
2 for each of these


















5. Note that the estimate scale parameter is then,









2.2 Intraday `Abnormal' Turnover
The second variable is the intraday abnormal turnover. The basis for this
variable is the observation that high trading volumes can signal informa-
tion.5 In the presence of HFT, this means that there should be high intraday
5See for example: Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998); Kim and Verrecchia (1991)
8volume spikes. Thus, the intraday abnormal turnover represents the devia-
tion of intraday trade from that of an ordinary volume prole. A deviation
from an `ordinary' intraday trade prole may convey information (follow-
ing Bialkowski, Darolles and Le Fol, 2008; Humphery-Jenner, 2011; Lo and
Wang, 2000; Manchaldore, Palit and Soloviev, 2010). The ordinary volume
prole is the percentage of the stock's daily volume that occurs in any given
intraday interval (called a `bin'). The abnormal turnover is the dierence
between the actual percent of daily turnover that trades in the interval and









Expected Turnoveri;tb = Ave Turnoveri;tb over past 30 days (7)
I use ve minute intervals and focus on the absolute value of the deviation
on grounds that both lulls and spikes in volume can convey information. I
dene the ordinary amount traded in any ve minute interval as the aver-
age proportion of turnover traded in that ve minute interval over the past
month.
92.3 Intraday Order Imbalance
The third variable is the intraday order imbalance. Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck
and Van Oppens (2007) show that daily order imbalance is more informative
around takeover announcements than are PIN and the spread components.
The order imbalance is the number of buy orders less the number of sell
orders divided by the total number of buy and sell orders. I focus on the
absolute order imbalance (as per Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck and Van Oppens,
2007). I calculate the order imbalance at ve minute intervals and control for
the moving average of the intraday order imbalance over the past ve days.
3 Methods and Materials
3.1 Empirical Strategy
I analyze whether HFT (a) helps to predict takeover activity, and (b) in-
uences takeover returns. The main independent variables are the HFT
variables. I measure these over some interval starting 11 days before day t.
The baseline HFT variable is just the variable on day t 11. However, I also
report results for the variable over a 5 day window (from t   11 to t   15)
and a 30 day window (from t   11 to t   40).
The prediction models use logit regressions. Here, the dependent variable
is an indicator that rm i receives a takeover oer within day t and day
t + j, denoted Bid
t+j
t . I focus on the rm receiving a bid over the windows
10(t;t + 5);(t;t + 10);(t;t + 30). The binomial logit model is common in the
literature (see e.g. Brar, Giamouridis and Liodakis, 2009; Palepu, 1986). The
model includes year dummies and standard errors clustered by GICS sector6
in order to control for takeover waves Almeida and Fernandes (consistent with
2008); Neumayer (consistent with 2008); Petersen (consistent with 2009). 7










The returns models use panel regressions and OLS regressions. There are
three sets of models. First, I examine only takeover targets. The sample
comprises only rms that receive a takeover oer. The dependent variable is
the rm's `return' on the date of the oer. The return is variously the rm's
raw return, the rm's market adjusted return, or the rm's industry (GICS
sector) adjusted return. I prefer the industry/market adjusted return to the
market-model-based abnormal return because some rms in the Australian
market are illiquid;8 and thus, might have biased and inconsistent market
model parameters (Dimson and Marsh, 1983; Scholes and Williams, 1977).
The model is in Equation (9).
6The results are robust to clustering by the alternative industry denition, the `GICS
group'
7The results are robust to using GICS group rather than GICS sector and to using in-
dustry dummies. GICs codes, rather than SIC codes, are standard industry classications
for Australian companies.




Second, I examine takeover targets and non-targets together. The sample
comprises all rms in the market. This is an unbalanced panel data set where
I observe each rm on each day. Thus, I run a rm-date panel xed-eects
regression that also clusters standard errors by GICS sector.9 The dependent
variables are variously the rm's stock return, GICS sector adjusted return,
and market adjusted return. The main independent variables are the HFT
variables, an indicator that the rm receives a bid on day t, and the interac-
tion thereof. If pre-announcement HFT drives returns, then the interaction





t k  I(Bidt);Controls) (10)
3.2 Sample and variables
I analyze the Australian market between 1998 and 2008. The Australian
market is an ideal market for this study. First, Australia transitioned from
a physical open out-cry market to a fully electronic market between 1987
and 1990. Australia has allowed direct market access and automated trading
9The results are robust to using an OLS regression with year and/or GICS sector/group
dummies.
12since 1997, thereby facilitating algorithmic trading. These combined facts
mean that the Australian market has been relatively liquid and automated
since before the sample period.10 Second, the Australian market is of a
manageable size, and this allows me to include most stocks on the ASX.
This sample-size makes it possible to analyze intraday trading information
for all stocks in the market. Third, the Australian market has a wide range
of liquid and illiquid stocks. This heterogeneity ensures that the results do
not merely apply to a sub-section of liquid stocks. Fourth, Australia has a
strong regulatory regime with eective enforcement of insider trading rules.11
The ASX is a fully electronic market that allows limit orders. It functions
through a continuous order matching process. Normal trading hours are
from 10:00 am to 4:00 pm. Stocks commence trading between 10:00 am and
10:30 am. Commencement is staggered by alphabetical order. Trading closes
between 4:00 pm and 4:05 pm. A nal closing auction determines the closing
price. I only include observations that occur between 10:30 am and 4:00 pm.
The stock market variables come from Reuters (as in Humphery-Jenner,
2011). Here, Reuters provides intraday trading information and stock return
information. The takeover announcement data comes from SDC platinum
as is standard in the takeover literature. The fundamental rm-level data
10Full information is available from ASX (2010).
11I note that Cumming, Johan and Li (2011) indicate that Australia has relatively
poor stock exchange rules. However, in Australia, all relevant rules are in the Corpora-
tions Act 2001 (Cth) Division 3 (available here: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
C2011C00013/Download). For a detailed discussion see Lyon and du Plessis (2005). Thus,
exchange rules are not necessary to govern insider trading in Australia.
13is from FinAnalysis (as in Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011). The full
sample is an unbalanced panel where I have an observation for each stock
on each day.12 I use the panel sample when analyzing the likelihood that a
rm receives a bid (Equation (8) and when comparing target-rms' returns
to other rms' returns (Equation (10)). I collapse this into a cross-sectional
sample when I analyze the sample of targeted rms. Here, I only have one
observation for each rm and takeover bid. The sample comprises 1186
companies. Of these, 540 receive a bid at some time. These bids can be
of varying sizes and for varying degrees of control. I do not require the bid
to be successful.13. There are 1014 rm-day observations on which there
is a takeover bid, and 1,262,468 rm-day observations on which there is no
takeover bid.
3.3 Independent Variables
I use two classes of independent variables. First, the takeover prediction
models examine an indicator that equals one if the rm received a takeover
oer between day t and t + k. I report results for k = 5;10;20. I obtain the
takeover announcement dates from SDC platinum.
Second, the returns-based models examine the stock's return on day t.
I examine the raw return, the `market adjusted' return (the raw return less
12I note that some stocks have missing days for days when there were insucient trades
to compute microstructure variables.
13Note that requiring the bid to be for 100% control of the company reduces number of
bid-observations but increases the ability to detect a takeover
14the equally weighted market return) and the `industry adjusted' return (the
raw return less the equally weighted stock return for all stocks in the rm's
GICS sector14). The stock return data is from Reuters.
3.4 HFT Variables
Section 2 details the variables. I obtain the data to compute these variables
from Reuters. I estimate both the raw variable on day t 11 and the average
of the HFT variable between day t   11 and t   k, where k 2 f1;:::;30g.
For brevity, I only report the 5 day window (t 11 to t 15) and the 30 day
window (t   11 to t   40). The results hold for the intermediate windows.
The intraday data is from Reuters.
3.5 Control Variables
The control variables are factors that might help to predict the likelihood of
a takeover. Note that Australia has dierent governance arrangements from
the U.S: Australia forbids (1) anti-takeover provisions (Humphery-Jenner and
Powell, 2011), (2) `frustrating actions' designed purely to resist a takeover
rather than to maximize shareholder value (Takeovers Panel, 2010, Guidance
Note 12), and (3) dual-class shares in general.15 Further, Australian compa-
14The results are robust to using GICS group rather than GICS sector.
15ASX Listing Rule 6.9 mandates that one share has one vote, and Rule 6.10 prevents
corporations from removing voting rights (ASX, 2001). It is possible to adopt a dual-class
structure in Australia; however, it tends to apply to unusual corporate arrangements.
An example is AWB (Australian Wheat Board), which began as a farmer-owned mutual
company with a government backed monopoly. AWB attempted to move toward a single-
15nies that list on the ASX must comply with the ASX corporate governance
principles, which stimulate appropriate internal governance arrangements.16
Firm Size (`ln(Assets)'): Large size should weakly decrease the like-
lihood of a takeover. Large rms are more expensive to acquire; and thus,
should be less likely to receive a takeover oer (Powell, 2001, 1997). However,
this eect is likely to be weak because: (1) Oenberg (2009) shows that size
does not eectively entrench managers and protect them from disciplinary
takeovers, suggesting that bidders focus more on the rm's price-to-book than
on its mere size. (2) Australian companies tend to be smaller than compa-
nies in other countries (Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011); and thus, are
should benet less from a size-based entrenchment eect.
Debt/Assets: Financial leverage may inuence the likelihood of a takeover.
One possibility is that leverage might reduces the likelihood of a takeover.
This is for two reasons. First, leverage reduces free cash ows. This re-
duces Jensen (1986) type agency conicts (following Harford, 1999; Maloney,
McCormick and Mitchell, 1993). This reduces the attractiveness of a disci-
plinary takeover. Second, leverage reduces available cash holdings. Faleye
(2004) shows that cash rich rms are more likely to be taken over. Thus,
leverage should reduce takeover likelihood. An alternative possibility is that
class structure in 2008. AWB delisted in 2010. Nenova (2003) and Doidge (2004) report
that only 3 Australian companies have dual-class shares.
16These principles stipulate matters such as the rm's disclosure obli-
gations and the required number of independent directors (ASX, 2003,
2008). The listing rules are available from http://www.asxgroup.com.au/
asx-listing-rules-guidance-notes-and-waivers.htm. Dierent rules have ap-
plied at dierent times; however, year-dummies capture this change.
16excess leverage can induce nancial distress in industry downturns (see Opler
and Titman, 1994). This might motivate distress-motivated takeovers.
Market Cap/Assets: Highly stock prices make rms more attractive;
and thus, less likely candidates for a takeover (Powell, 2001, 1997). Thus,
I control for the rm's market capitalization on day t divided by its assets
reported in the last nancial report.
Industry Adjusted Operating Performance (IAOP): Strongly per-
forming companies are less likely to be the subject of a disciplinary takeover,
are more likely to trade at higher market prices; and thus, are less likely to
be takeover targets. Thus, I control for the industry adjusted operating per-
formance. The rm's operating performance is the its return on assets. The
industry adjusted operating performance is the rm's ROA less the median
ROA of rms in its GICS sector.
Industry M&A Activity: Takeover activity tends to occur in waves
across time and industry (Harford, 2005; Powell and Yawson, 2005). Thus,
I control for the number of M&A deals in the rm's GICS sector over the
past year scaled by the total number of M&A deals that occurred in the past
year.17
High Tech Firm Indicator: High tech rms may be more apt takeover
targets because (a) they tend to be smaller and (b) they may be subject
17Robustness tests replace this variable with the total value of all deals in the rm's
industry in the prior year divided by the total value of deals in the prior year. This variable
does not signicantly inuence takeover likelihood and does not change the results for the
main microstructure-based variables.
17to bids designed to replace internal R&D with external technological acqui-
sitions (Gerpott, 1995; Granstrand, Bohlin, Oskarsson and Sj oberg, 1992;
Vanhaverbeke, Duysters and Noorderhaven, 2002). The high tech rm indi-
cator equals one if the rm's GICS group is pharmaceutical, semi-conductor,
software, or information technology.
Industry Concentration (HHI): Low industry concentration should
increase the takeover likelihood as rms engage in `roll-up' takeovers designed
to maximize market share (Powell and Yawson, 2005). Thus, I control for
the HHI of the rm's GICS sector in the year.18
Cash Payment: The OLS models in Equation (9) also control for the
method of payment. This is based on prior literature that shows that the
method of payment inuences the takeover premium and/or the market's
reaction to the takeover (for acquire-returns results see Chang, 1998; Fuller,
Netter and Stegemoller, 2002).
4 Results and Analysis
4.1 Sample Description
The univariate statistics indicate that (a) takeover returns increase with the
level of HFT and pre-takeover trading and (b) there are some key dierences
between target and non-target rms.
18I calculate the HHI as the sum of squared market shares for all rms in the GICS
sector. The market share is the rm's sales divided by the total sales for all companies in
that rm's industry and year.
18Table 1 contains the statistics for the HFT variables. The main ndings
are: (1) The HFT variables are relatively stable over time-horizon; that is, the
1-day, 5-day, 15-day and 30-day moving averages are similar in magnitude.
(2) The HFT variables are stable across years. This is relatively unsurpris-
ing given that Australia has allowed direct market access for the whole of
the sample period. (3) The HFT variables may dier between targets and
non-targets. Specically, Panel C contains statistics sorted by rm-size and
whether the rm receives a takeover bid on day t. Small targets (assets in
the bottom 50% of the sample) have higher HFT than do small non-targets.
However, large targets have lower HFT than do large non-targets. This im-
plies that a multivariate regression framework is necessary to fully analyze
the relation between takeovers and HFT.
Table 4 contains the rm-level statistics for targets and non-targets.
There are some signicant dierences between targets and non-targets. The
dierences quadrate with prior literature (see Brar, Giamouridis and Lio-
dakis, 2009; Powell, 2001, 1997). This implies that it is important to control
for these factors when analyzing takeover prediction/returns.
Table 2 and Table 3 focus on takeover targets. Table 2 only examines rm-
day combinations on which the rm receives a takeover bid. The main result
is that there are positive returns on such days (the raw, market adjusted,
and industry adjusted returns are positive). However, the returns are of
relatively small magnitude. This is because I do not require the takeover bid
to be completed or to be for 100% control of the company. Table 3 contains
19correlations between the returns and the HFT variables. The key result is
that there is a signicant positive correlation between most HFT variables
and the stock returns.
Overall, the results suggest that there is a relationship between (a) HFT
variables, (b) the occurrence of a takeover, and (c) takeover returns. How-
ever, when analyzing this relationship it is necessary to control for rm-level
characteristics.
4.2 Takeover Return Results
This section discusses the takeover return results. The predictions are that
pre-takeover informed trade is positively related to takeover returns. That is,
informed trade can predict the market's reaction to the takeover announce-
ment. I analyze this by (a) running a cross-sectional regression on the sample
of targets, and (b) running a panel regression on the sample of all rms.
The cross sectional results are in Table 5. The sample comprises takeover
targets only. The key result is that the Weibull shape parameter is posi-
tive and signicant in all models. This implies that pre-takeover informed
trade helps to predict target returns. Few control variables are signicant.
The main ndings are that (1) strong pre-takeover performance increases
takeover returns. (2) High-tech rms takeovers receive a more negative mar-
ket reaction. This quadrates with prior evidence that the market tends to
under-value high-tech investments Humphery-Jenner (see 2010).
The panel regression xed eects results are in Table 6 and the panel
20random eects results are in Table 7. The results are similar in both mod-
els. The main independent variable is the interaction term `Weibull Shape
Parameter
t 11
t j  I(Bidt)'. Here, the interaction term is positive and signi-
cant at 1% in all models. This implies that stock returns increase especially
with a combination of (a) a bid and (b) pre-takeover informed trade.
The panel regressions yield some other interesting results. First, the mere
presence of a bid on day t does not signicantly inuence returns on day t
after controlling for pre-takeover informed trade. That is, while `Weibull
Shape Parameter
t 11
t j  I(Bidt)' is positive and signicant in all models,
I(Bidt) is not signicant.
Second, the level of informed trade in a stock continues to inuence
returns whether or not there is a bid. That is the term `Weibull Shape
Parameter
t 11
t j ' is positive and signicant in most models.
Third, the other informed trade variables (intraday abnormal turnover,
and order imbalance) are positively and signicantly related to returns in all
models. However, unreported results suggest that their interactions with the
indicator I(Bidt) are not signicant.
Overall, the results suggest that the level of informed trade (a) inuences
stock returns in general, and (b) inuences the returns to target rms in
especial. This implies that pre-takeover informed trade is an important de-
terminant of takeover returns and that failure to control for it may induce
an omitted variable bias.
214.3 Takeover Prediction Results
The main goal is to examine whether intraday variables can help to predict
takeover events.
Table 8 contains the prediction results. The key result is that the Weibull
shape parameter signicantly predicts takeover events. Further, the intraday
abnormal trunover is positive and signicant at 1% in most models. This
implies that there is a high level of intraday-based abnormal trade before
takeover announcements.
The control variables have some important implications. First, volatile
companies are more likely to be acquired. Companies with a high stock return
variance are signicantly more likely to receive a bid in all models. This is
unsurpising given that high stock variance can represent a high dispersion of
opinion and information asymmetry.
Second, high market-to-book ratios reduce takeover likelihood. The coef-
cient on `Market Cap/Assets' is negative and signicant in all models. This
implies that `expensive' companies are less likely to receive takeover oers.
An explanation is that high stock prices deter disciplinary (or opportunistic)
takeovers that are designed to acquire cheap assets and/or to remove poorly
performing managers.
Third, company size (as proxied by `ln(Assets)') does not signicantly
inuence the likelihood of a takeover. This appears surprising. However,
it quadrates with the ndings in Oenberg (2009). A key explanation is a
combination of the observations that: (1) large companies are more likely
22to suer from agency conicts and ineciencies (see Moeller, Schlingemann
and Stulz, 2004, 2005); and thus, are more likely to be candidates for disci-
plinary takeovers. (2) Even large companies in Australia are relatively small
(Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011). Thus, large companies in Australia
may be prime takeover targets.
Fourth, M&A activity in the rm's industry over the prior year is a useful
predictor of a rm's takeover likelihood. This quadrates with prior evidence
that takeover activity tends to occur in industry waves (see Harford, 2005;
Powell and Yawson, 2005, 2007).
Fifth, highly levered companies are more likely to receive a takeover bid.
This suggests that for the targets in the sample, high leverage may connote
nancial distress. This might facilitate restructuring-orientated takeovers.
Sixth, strongly performing companies are less likely to receive a takeover
bid. This is consistent with Agrawal and Jae (2003) and quadrates with the
theory that strong performance deters hostile acquisitions that are designed
to remove inecient managers.
The model diagnostics are encouraging. The R2 values are low. However,
(a) they are only marginally lower than those reported in cross-sectional
takeover studies (see Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Masulis, Wang
and Xie, 2007; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004, 2005); and (b) they
appear acceptable given that there are few takeover events and the sample
comprises all companies that list on the ASX. Further, the ROC areas are
reasonable. They are comparable to those reported in Demers and Joos
23(2007) in a bankruptcy prediction context.19 Figure 1 graphs the ROC areas
and Table 8 reports them.
4.4 Robustness
This section indicates that the results are robust. (1) The results are robust
to time period holding when I split the time period into ve-year blocks. (2)
The results are robust to clustering, holding when I cluster by year, GICS
sector, GICS group, and/or rm. (3) The results (for the HFT variables)
are robust to the use of a parsimonious model, which drops all insignicant
control variables. (4) The results hold when I replace the bid indicator with
an indicator that equals one if the bid was for a complete controlling stake
in the company.20 (5) The results are robust to HFT time horizon (holding
when I use moving averages between 5 days and 30 days) and to acquisition
time-horizon (being qualitatively the same when I predict a bid in the next
5 to 20 days).
5 Conclusion
I propose new ways to detect HFT, and show that HFT helps to predict
takeover targets and inuences takeover returns. The literature has docu-
mented the presence of a run-up in takeover targets. However, it has not
19They are also similar to, and exceed, the ROC areas that Demers and Joos (2007)
report for the models in Altman (1968), Zmijewski (1984) and Chava and Jarrow (2004).
20I dene this as a bid for over 90% of the target, at which point the acquirer can
compulsorily acquire the remaining 10% of outstanding shares.
24analyzed the existence of HFT before takeovers and the literature on in-
formed trading has generally relied on monthly variables.
I address these issues by proposing three HFT-based variables. First,
the Weibull shape parameter models the time between trades. Second, the
level of abnormal trade measures deviation from a `standard' trading pat-
tern. Third, the absolute order imbalance detects the existence of buy or sell
pressure. I show that the Weibull shape parameter especially helps to predict
takeovers and drives the markets's reaction to a takeover announcement.
These results have important implications. First, they show that failure
to control for HFT might induce an omitted variable bias in takeover returns
models. Second, they provide an additional input for takeover prediction
models. Third, they have implications for regulators by providing an addi-
tional way for detect the presence of informed trade. In particular, they show
that a high level of HFT might indicate the presence of informed (possibly
insider) trading. Future literature can further analyze these variables within
the context of acquirer returns and in markets that have less exposure to
high frequency algorithmic trading.
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26Table 1: Intraday Variable Statistics
Table 1 contains statistics for the intraday variables: the Weibull shape parameter, intraday order imbalance, and intraday abnormal turnover. I compute the moving
average variable over 5, 15, or 30 days. The column title indicates the relevant moving average interval. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
HFT Window 1 Day: HFTt 11 5 Day: HFTt 11
t 15 15 Day: HFTt 11


































Panel A: General Statistics
Mean 0.3211 0.8858 0.2663 0.3495 0.8873 0.2683 0.3654 0.8873 0.2682 0.3739 0.8876 0.2682
Median 0.1285 1.0000 0.2620 0.1674 0.9333 0.2638 0.1839 0.9343 0.2652 0.1928 0.9366 0.2660
Min 0.0081 0.0000 0.1930 0.0155 0.0000 0.1940 0.0169 0.0000 0.1940 0.0175 0.0000 0.1940
Max 3.7255 1.0000 2.0000 3.4571 1.0000 2.0000 3.3853 1.0000 0.9297 3.3431 1.0000 0.6034
Standard Deviation 0.5524 0.1664 0.0357 0.5239 0.1409 0.0289 0.5199 0.1351 0.0172 0.5178 0.1326 0.0134
Panel B: Averages By year
1998 0.3112 0.9056 0.2652 0.3584 0.9071 0.2675 0.4048 0.9093 0.2678 0.4124 0.9089 0.2679
1999 0.3531 0.8948 0.2640 0.4024 0.8962 0.2663 0.4254 0.8950 0.2661 0.4414 0.8959 0.2659
2000 0.3189 0.8791 0.2661 0.3494 0.8801 0.2679 0.3653 0.8801 0.2679 0.3768 0.8800 0.2677
2001 0.2750 0.8786 0.2660 0.3023 0.8799 0.2683 0.3211 0.8804 0.2682 0.3243 0.8804 0.2681
2002 0.3073 0.9022 0.2675 0.3412 0.9037 0.2696 0.3636 0.9046 0.2696 0.3738 0.9035 0.2695
2003 0.3333 0.9054 0.2669 0.3662 0.9074 0.2690 0.3814 0.9072 0.2688 0.3956 0.9075 0.2688
2004 0.3589 0.9039 0.2671 0.3864 0.9057 0.2691 0.4052 0.9056 0.2689 0.4132 0.9059 0.2689
2005 0.3547 0.8909 0.2663 0.3852 0.8929 0.2683 0.4016 0.8931 0.2681 0.4100 0.8932 0.2680
2006 0.3437 0.8883 0.2659 0.3709 0.8900 0.2679 0.3837 0.8899 0.2678 0.3936 0.8902 0.2677
2007 0.2953 0.8682 0.2666 0.3154 0.8685 0.2684 0.3223 0.8679 0.2683 0.3288 0.8690 0.2682
2008 0.2390 0.8448 0.2657 0.2559 0.8452 0.2682 0.2671 0.8444 0.2679 0.2669 0.8451 0.2678
Panel C: Averages by rm size and whether company receives a takeover bid on day t
Panel C(i): All Firms
No Bid on day t 0.3210 0.8858 0.2663 0.3495 0.8873 0.2683 0.3653 0.8874 0.2682 0.3738 0.8877 0.2682
Bid on day t 0.3311 0.8705 0.2662 0.3510 0.8706 0.2685 0.4965 0.8640 0.2670 0.4725 0.8682 0.2677
2
7Panel C(ii): Assets in the bottom 50% of the sample
No Bid on day t 0.5025 0.9472 0.2707 0.5443 0.9475 0.2728 0.5661 0.9474 0.2726 0.5784 0.9473 0.2724
Bid on day t 0.5475 0.9526 0.2731 0.5612 0.9511 0.2744 0.7473 0.9435 0.2716 0.7271 0.9467 0.2728
Panel C(iii): Assets in the top 50% of the sample
No Bid on day t 0.1412 0.8262 0.2628 0.1564 0.8276 0.2639 0.1645 0.8273 0.2639 0.1692 0.8280 0.2639
Bid on day t 0.1445 0.8014 0.2618 0.1696 0.8013 0.2635 0.2772 0.7944 0.2629 0.2499 0.7995 0.2632
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8Table 2: Target Firm Univariate statistics
Table 2 contains univariate statistics for the sample of 1014 days on which rms receive takeover bids. Note that a rm can receive multiple bids (i.e. if the rst n
takeover bids are unsuccessful).
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 25th Pctile 75 Pctile
Return 0.0269 0.0112 0.0602 -0.1200 0.1500 -0.0056 0.0552
IAR 0.0253 0.0112 0.0585 -0.1243 0.1906 -0.0076 0.0530
MAR 0.0259 0.0111 0.0594 -0.1323 0.1835 -0.0072 0.0547
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11 0.3311 0.1345 0.5765 0.0081 3.7255 0.0587 0.3451
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11 0.8705 0.9583 0.1788 0.0000 1.0000 0.7937 1.0000
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t j 0.2662 0.2610 0.0346 0.2300 0.8980 0.2560 0.2680
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 15 0.3510 0.1827 0.4991 0.0155 3.4571 0.0778 0.4159
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 15 0.8706 0.9290 0.1610 0.1950 1.0000 0.8184 1.0000
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 15 0.2685 0.2632 0.0295 0.2432 0.7840 0.2582 0.2703
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 25 0.4965 0.2426 0.6942 0.0169 3.3853 0.0962 0.5641
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 25 0.8640 0.9257 0.1574 0.2132 1.0000 0.8204 0.9667
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 25 0.2670 0.2636 0.0173 0.2330 0.4734 0.2589 0.2698
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 40 0.4725 0.2306 0.6612 0.0175 3.3431 0.0959 0.5330
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 40 0.8682 0.9317 0.1536 0.2074 1.0000 0.8373 0.9644
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 40 0.2677 0.2647 0.0145 0.2330 0.4208 0.2594 0.2711
2
9Table 3: Pairwise Correlation Results for Takeover Targets
Table 3 contains the pairwise correlation results for the sample that contains only takeover targets. Here, the sample comprises rms that receive a takeover bid on day
t. Brackets contain p-values.




C MARt 0.990 0.995
[0.000] [0.000]
D Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11 0.020 0.027 0.021
[0.533] [0.407] [0.518]
E Intraday Order Imbalancet 11 0.042 0.033 0.033 0.121
[0.192] [0.314] [0.307] [0.000]
F Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t j 0.108 0.094 0.102 0.043 0.207
[0.002] [0.008] [0.004] [0.224] [0.000]
G Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 15 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.725 0.200 0.090
[0.741] [0.843] [0.869] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010]
H Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 15 0.040 0.032 0.032 0.203 0.882 0.174 0.237
[0.210] [0.324] [0.314] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
I Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 15 0.098 0.093 0.094 0.090 0.231 0.674 0.105
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
J Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 25 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.473 0.240 0.188 0.662
[0.256] [0.306] [0.299] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
K Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 25 0.026 0.018 0.018 0.207 0.872 0.177 0.260
[0.421] [0.563] [0.581] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
L Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 25 0.059 0.052 0.055 0.158 0.349 0.512 0.264
[0.064] [0.102] [0.084] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 40 0.044 0.040 0.041 0.478 0.249 0.244 0.672
[0.167] [0.213] [0.195] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 40 0.028 0.022 0.020 0.215 0.867 0.181 0.265
[0.372] [0.498] [0.524] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
O Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 40 0.071 0.069 0.069 0.198 0.416 0.404 0.272
[0.025] [0.031] [0.030] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
H I J K L M N
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0I Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 15 0.246
[0.000]
J Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 25 0.268 0.148
[0.000] [0.000]
K Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 25 0.957 0.250 0.232
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
L Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 25 0.355 0.513 0.230 0.386
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t 40 0.267 0.175 0.947 0.240 0.255
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t 40 0.958 0.251 0.238 0.990 0.380 0.244
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
O Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t 40 0.431 0.497 0.245 0.465 0.757 0.271 0.468
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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1Table 4: Univariate statistics
Table 4 contains univariate statistics for the rm-level characteristics. Columns 1-5 contain statistics for rms that receive a takeover bid in year y. Columns 6-10 contain
statistics for rms that do not receive a bid in year y. Note that a rm can move from one sample to the other. For example, if a rm receives a bid in 1994 but not
1995, it will be in the target sample for 1994 but not for 1995 (and vice-versa). Superscripts , , and  in Columns 11 and 12 denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and
10% in dierence in means and dierence in medians tests, respectively.
Takeover Targets (Bid for in year y) Non Targets (Not Bid For in year y) Target - Non Target
Mean Median Std
Dev
Min Max Mean Median Std
Dev
Min Max Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Debt/Assets 0.164 0.094 0.192 0.000 0.821 0.145 0.054 0.189 0.000 0.821 0.019 0.041
Market Cap/Assets 1.921 1.169 2.565 0.093 18.296 2.207 1.255 2.950 0.093 18.296 -
0.287
-0.086
IAOP -0.019 0.016 0.268 -1.407 0.523 -0.041 0.010 0.290 -1.407 0.523 0.022 0.006
ln(Assets) 18.401 17.989 2.525 13.666 25.405 17.564 17.175 2.306 13.666 25.405 0.837 0.815
Industry M&A Activity 0.179 0.145 0.111 0.000 0.390 0.161 0.122 0.107 0.000 0.390 0.017 0.023
High Tech Firm 0.105 0.000 0.307 0.000 1.000 0.117 0.000 0.322 0.000 1.000 -0.012 0.000
HHI (Sales Based) 0.265 0.180 0.215 0.000 1.000 0.269 0.194 0.205 0.000 1.000 -0.005 -
0.014
Number of Observations 874 7144
3
2Table 5: OLS Regression Results
Table 5 contains the takeover returns results. The sample comprises takeover targets. The models include year dummies and use robust standard errors clustered by
GICS sector. The dependent variable is variously the rm's raw return (denoted `Return'), the market-adjusted return (`MAR'), or the GICS sector (industry) adjusted
return (`IAR'). The main independent variables are the moving average of the Weibull shape parameter, intraday order imbalance, and intraday abnormal turnover. The
column title indicates the horizon for the moving average. Brackets contain p-values based upon robust standard errors clustered by vintage. Superscripts , , and
 denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Model OLS, year xed eects, GICS sector clustering
Sample Takeover Targets
HFT Window 1 Day: HFTt 11 5 Day: HFTt 11
t 15 30 Day: HFTt 11
t 40
Dependent Variable Return MAR IAR Return MAR IAR Return MAR IAR
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t j 0.162 0.152 0.130 0.166 0.157 0.155 0.242 0.235 0.236
[0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002] [0.012] [0.025] [0.012]
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t j 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 -0.001
[0.197] [0.131] [0.120] [0.950] [0.909] [0.911] [0.969] [0.959] [0.902]
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t j -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 0.005 0 -0.001 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011
[0.887] [0.751] [0.755] [0.732] [0.975] [0.916] [0.676] [0.531] [0.574]
Stock Return Variancet 11
t 190 0.102 0.085 0.102 0.524 0.516 0.474 0.506 0.493 0.461
[0.760] [0.791] [0.747] [0.360] [0.347] [0.367] [0.331] [0.316] [0.332]
Industry Return Variancet 11
t 190 -0.654 -0.912 -0.965 0.929 0.657 0.513 0.775 0.5 0.36
[0.650] [0.484] [0.479] [0.529] [0.651] [0.718] [0.592] [0.727] [0.798]
Industry Stock Returnt 11
t 190 -1.429 -1.265 -0.978 -1.434 -1.288 -1.027 -1.312 -1.16 -0.905
[0.478] [0.514] [0.600] [0.426] [0.463] [0.536] [0.470] [0.514] [0.594]
Stock Returnt 11
t 190 0.322 0.341 0.44 -0.406 -0.422 -0.29 -0.357 -0.37 -0.241
[0.626] [0.596] [0.487] [0.587] [0.565] [0.692] [0.623] [0.603] [0.735]
Cash Payment 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
[0.503] [0.575] [0.491] [0.298] [0.248] [0.289] [0.341] [0.287] [0.339]
Debt/Assets -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011
[0.782] [0.694] [0.804] [0.439] [0.380] [0.481] [0.500] [0.436] [0.530]
Market Cap/Assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.286] [0.310] [0.341] [0.293] [0.293] [0.301] [0.285] [0.280] [0.281]
IAOP 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.020
[0.030] [0.024] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.035] [0.024] [0.024] [0.032]
ln(Assets) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.492] [0.495] [0.451] [0.669] [0.550] [0.519] [0.552] [0.509] [0.511]
Industry M&A Activity 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.017 0.016 0.02 0.016 0.015 0.019
3
3[0.726] [0.670] [0.571] [0.412] [0.445] [0.363] [0.472] [0.498] [0.405]
High Tech Firm -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014
[0.188] [0.226] [0.535] [0.006] [0.007] [0.022] [0.007] [0.007] [0.021]
HHI (Sales Based) -0.019 -0.022 -0.023 -0.008 -0.01 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.013
[0.042] [0.016] [0.014] [0.351] [0.231] [0.210] [0.321] [0.219] [0.202]
Constant 0.003 0.007 0.012 -0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -0.015 -0.008 -0.012
[0.939] [0.875] [0.785] [0.670] [0.886] [0.887] [0.797] [0.887] [0.833]
Observations 765 765 765 930 930 930 930 930 930
R-Squared 5.80% 6.10% 6.20% 4.30% 4.50% 4.50% 4.00% 4.20% 4.20%
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4Table 6: Fixed Eects Panel Regression Results
Table 6 contains panel xed eects results. The sample comprises all rms listed on the ASX that have the relevant variables. The models are panel xed eects models
with company/date panels and GICS sector clustered standard errors. The dependent variable is variously the rm's raw return (denoted `Return'), the market-adjusted
return (`MAR'), or the GICS sector (industry) adjusted return (`IAR'). The main independent variables are the moving average of the Weibull shape parameter, intraday
order imbalance, and intraday abnormal turnover. The column title indicates the horizon for the moving average. Brackets contain p-values based upon robust standard
errors clustered by vintage. Superscripts , , and  denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Model Panel Fixed Eects (company/date), industry clustering
Sample All rms
HFT Window 1 Day: HFTt 11 5 Day: HFTt 11
t 15 30 Day: HFTt 11
t 40
Dependent Variable Return MAR IAR Return MAR IAR Return MAR IAR
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t j 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.038 0.038 0.035
[0.121] [0.112] [0.209] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
I(Bidt) -0.023 -0.019 -0.016 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.027 -0.023 -0.022
[0.070] [0.136] [0.145] [0.138] [0.186] [0.144] [0.249] [0.305] [0.292]
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t j  I(Bidt) 0.182 0.168 0.153 0.170 0.159 0.157 0.199 0.181 0.177
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.032] [0.034] [0.030]
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t j 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t j 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.009
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Stock Return Variancet 11
t 190 0.106 0.090 0.089 0.138 0.122 0.120 0.132 0.116 0.114
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Industry Return Variancet 11
t 190 0.116 -0.046 -0.015 0.149 -0.018 0.013 0.149 -0.019 0.012
[0.154] [0.328] [0.479] [0.087] [0.654] [0.594] [0.076] [0.608] [0.646]
Industry Stock Returnt 11
t 190 -0.228 0.049 0.023 -0.272 0.009 -0.014 -0.271 0.011 -0.011
[0.071] [0.502] [0.516] [0.038] [0.892] [0.664] [0.033] [0.856] [0.729]
Stock Returnt 11
t 190 -0.249 -0.211 -0.209 -0.280 -0.245 -0.242 -0.273 -0.238 -0.236
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Debt/Assets -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.315] [0.365] [0.487] [0.203] [0.215] [0.317] [0.109] [0.108] [0.155]
Market Cap/Assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
IAOP 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln(Assets) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
3
5[0.200] [0.823] [0.588] [0.074] [0.220] [0.432] [0.003] [0.005] [0.009]
Industry M&A Activity 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
[0.846] [0.670] [0.162] [0.407] [0.718] [0.996] [0.396] [0.750] [0.914]
HHI (Sales Based) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.220] [0.197] [0.035] [0.464] [0.442] [0.081] [0.569] [0.553] [0.135]
Constant -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 -0.016 -0.012 -0.010 -0.036 -0.031 -0.027
[0.000] [0.004] [0.009] [0.000] [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 970,811 970,811 970,811 1,163,045 1,163,045 1,163,045 1,163,044 1,163,044 1,163,044
Number of Companies 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158
R-Squared Within 0.300% 0.200% 0.200% 0.400% 0.300% 0.200% 0.400% 0.300% 0.300%
R-Squared Between 1.600% 0.300% 0.200% 0.000% 0.100% 0.100% 0.000% 0.200% 0.300%
R-Squared Overall 0.200% 0.100% 0.100% 0.200% 0.100% 0.100% 0.200% 0.200% 0.200%
3
6Table 7: Random Eeccts Panel Regression Results
Table 7 contains panel random eects results. The sample comprises all rms listed on the ASX that have the relevant variables. The models are panel random eects
models with company/date panels. The dependent variable is variously the rm's raw return (denoted `Return'), the market-adjusted return (`MAR'), or the GICS sector
(industry) adjusted return (`IAR'). The main independent variables are the moving average of the Weibull shape parameter, intraday order imbalance, and intraday
abnormal turnover. The column title indicates the horizon for the moving average. Brackets contain p-values based upon robust standard errors clustered by vintage.
Superscripts , , and  denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Model Panel Random Eects (company/date), industry clustering
Sample All rms
HFT Window 1 Day: HFTt 11 5 Day: HFTt 11
t 15 30 Day: HFTt 11
t 40
Dependent Variable Return MAR IAR Return MAR IAR Return MAR IAR
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t j 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.038 0.038 0.035
[0.077] [0.069] [0.157] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
I(Bidt) -0.021 -0.018 -0.014 -0.021 -0.018 -0.018 -0.031 -0.026 -0.026
[0.066] [0.152] [0.178] [0.077] [0.118] [0.078] [0.152] [0.188] [0.173]
Weibull Shape Parametert 11
t j  I(Bidt) 0.176 0.162 0.147 0.174 0.163 0.161 0.212 0.194 0.190
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004]
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t j 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t j 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.009
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Stock Return Variancet 11
t 190 0.102 0.086 0.086 0.133 0.117 0.116 0.127 0.111 0.109
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Industry Return Variancet 11
t 190 0.114 -0.045 -0.011 0.147 -0.016 0.017 0.146 -0.018 0.015
[0.124] [0.315] [0.594] [0.052] [0.662] [0.483] [0.042] [0.606] [0.542]
Industry Stock Returnt 11
t 190 -0.228 0.044 0.014 -0.272 0.004 -0.023 -0.268 0.008 -0.019
[0.040] [0.523] [0.678] [0.013] [0.951] [0.463] [0.010] [0.895] [0.546]
Stock Returnt 11
t 190 -0.232 -0.196 -0.196 -0.263 -0.228 -0.227 -0.257 -0.222 -0.222
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Debt/Assets -0.001 -0.001 0.00 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.258] [0.307] [0.468] [0.174] [0.190] [0.340] [0.073] [0.074] [0.142]
Market Cap/Assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
IAOP 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln(Assets) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
3
7[0.008] [0.135] [0.150] [0.002] [0.013] [0.019] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Industry M&A Activity 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.981] [0.599] [0.501] [0.432] [0.661] [0.606] [0.478] [0.782] [0.758]
High Tech Firm -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
HHI (Sales Based) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
[0.313] [0.234] [0.012] [0.746] [0.701] [0.103] [0.821] [0.776] [0.154]
Constant -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.017 -0.014 -0.012 -0.037 -0.033 -0.029
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 970,811 970,811 970,811 1,163,045 1,163,045 1,163,045 1,163,044 1,163,044 1,163,044
Number of Companies 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158
R-Squared Within 0.30% 0.20% 0.20% 0.40% 0.20% 0.20% 0.40% 0.30% 0.30%
R-Squared Between 0.90% 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.30% 0.30%
R-Squared Overall 0.20% 0.10% 0.10% 0.20% 0.20% 0.20% 0.30% 0.20% 0.20%
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8Table 8: Prediction Results
Table 8 contains the takeover prediction results. All models are logit models, include year dummies, and use robust standard errors clustered by GICS sector. The
dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if a company becomes a takeover target in the next 20 days (in Columns 1-3), 10 days (in Columns 4-6), or 5 days (in
Columns 7-9). The main independent variables are the moving average of the Weibull shape parameter, intraday order imbalance, and intraday abnormal turnover. The
column title indicates the horizon for the moving average. The sample comprises all rms that have the relevant independent variables. Brackets contain p-values based
upon robust standard errors clustered by vintage. Superscripts , , and  denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Model Logit, year dummies, GICS sector clustering













t j 0.599 1.307 7.412 0.284 0.798 7.522 0.398 0.531 7.412
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.148] [0.012] [0.000] [0.019] [0.233] [0.000]
Intraday Abnormal Turnovert 11
t j 0.127 0.207 0.266 0.130 0.214 0.271 0.128 0.216 0.275
[0.042] [0.001] [0.001] [0.043] [0.001] [0.000] [0.064] [0.000] [0.000]
Intraday Order Imbalancet 11
t j -0.232 -0.222 -0.211 -0.332 -0.331 -0.184 -0.392 -0.406 -0.175
[0.149] [0.420] [0.495] [0.040] [0.219] [0.545] [0.033] [0.165] [0.577]
Stock Return Variancet 11
t 190 13.535 15.991 14.932 12.427 15.066 14.070 11.588 15.274 14.318
[0.009] [0.001] [0.002] [0.028] [0.003] [0.005] [0.085] [0.004] [0.006]
Industry Return Variancet 11
t 190 20.652 14.055 13.505 4.531 4.29 4.049 -4.343 -1.313 -1.436
[0.358] [0.450] [0.457] [0.824] [0.804] [0.808] [0.793] [0.938] [0.929]
Industry Stock Returnt 11
t 190 -50.417 -41.279 -38.952 -35.818 -31.886 -29.74 -34.13 -30.046 -27.855
[0.131] [0.143] [0.168] [0.308] [0.287] [0.321] [0.348] [0.325] [0.364]
Stock Returnt 11
t 190 -21.072 -21.972 -21.176 -19.483 -20.289 -19.526 -17.566 -20.272 -19.539
[0.144] [0.128] [0.144] [0.189] [0.181] [0.198] [0.298] [0.181] [0.194]
Debt/Assets 0.435 0.478 0.457 0.433 0.454 0.424 0.465 0.445 0.409
[0.058] [0.014] [0.020] [0.044] [0.008] [0.014] [0.040] [0.011] [0.019]
Market Cap/Assets -0.065 -0.073 -0.064 -0.061 -0.068 -0.056 -0.060 -0.064 -0.051
[0.022] [0.044] [0.065] [0.029] [0.053] [0.088] [0.029] [0.067] [0.111]
IAOP -0.432 -0.336 -0.328 -0.417 -0.311 -0.309 -0.383 -0.280 -0.279
[0.000] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.007] [0.006] [0.001] [0.013] [0.014]
ln(Assets) 0.017 0 0.028 0.011 -0.006 0.032 0.009 -0.006 0.038
[0.602] [0.998] [0.489] [0.724] [0.871] [0.399] [0.763] [0.886] [0.312]
Industry M&A Activity 1.469 1.026 1.057 1.398 0.939 0.988 1.366 0.930 0.987
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
High Tech Firm 0.01 0.105 0.118 0.004 0.088 0.102 -0.01 0.082 0.097
[0.932] [0.317] [0.241] [0.977] [0.455] [0.369] [0.942] [0.486] [0.392]
3
9HHI (Sales Based) 0.097 -0.103 -0.097 0.108 -0.075 -0.064 0.136 -0.068 -0.055
[0.669] [0.631] [0.639] [0.661] [0.760] [0.786] [0.627] [0.787] [0.818]
Constant -2.854 -2.577 -4.782 -3.309 -2.968 -5.647 -4.060 -3.644 -6.541
[0.000] [0.011] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 971,183 1,163,523 1,163,522 971,183 1,163,523 1,163,522 971,183 1,163,523 1,163,522
Pseudo R-Squared 6.40% 6.60% 6.70% 5.40% 5.60% 5.80% 4.30% 4.50% 4.70%
ROC Area 0.693 0.695 0.698 0.69 0.693 0.696 0.682 0.687 0.69
4
0Figure 1: ROC Curves
Figure 1 contains the ROC curves for logit models that predict the occurrence of
a takeover within 5, 10, or 20 days.
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